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*P.L. 767  It is significant that, despite notable exceptions such as art.45 of the 
Ecuadorean Constitution,1 arts 78 and 79 of the Venezuelan Constitution2 and 
art.41(6)(k) of the draft Kenyan Harmonised Constitution,3 recognition of children's 
participation rights other than in a legal, adjudicatory context is rare within child-specific 
provisions across countries.4 This contrasts with the significant rise in recognition of the 
“protection” and “provision” rights set out in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
at the domestic constitutional level. 
The relatively low priority accorded to children's participation rights in constitutional 
schema is well illustrated by one of the most celebrated children's rights provisions--that 
set out in the South African constitution. There was widespread political support for 
children's rights, evident in the process leading to the adoption of the children's rights 
section in the chapter on fundamental rights in the Interim Constitution of South Africa 
(and, subsequently, the Final Constitution).5 Constitutional negotiations involved much 
discussion of the particular suffering experienced and sacrifices made by children during 
the liberation struggle, with participants in the national debate on rights arguing that, as 
children had played a central and highly visible role in the South African struggle for 
dignity, they were owed a debt by the nation.6 
 *P.L. 768  Despite the role of children as political actors during apartheid, it is notable 
that the South African Constitution does not make provision for children's participation 
rights other than providing for a right to legal representation in criminal7 and, in limited 
circumstances, civil proceedings.8 Instead, the child's right to participate is enshrined at a 
statutory level in a provision that only came into force over a decade after the Final 
Constitution.9 Clearly, however, guaranteeing that right in legislation is not the same as 
according it constitutional status. Admittedly, children are accorded the constitutional 
political rights of all “citizens” to form a political party, to participate in the activities of, or 
recruit members for, a political party; and to campaign for a political party or cause.10 
They are also entitled to the right to free, fair and regular elections for any legislative body 
established in terms of the Constitution.11 However, the key political rights to vote and run 
for public office are reserved to “adult citizens”.12 
Numerous justifications and aims have been proffered for children's participation. These 
vary from upholding children's rights to enhancing the child's self-esteem to improving 
decision-making.13 Crucially, work in the area of child participation reflects a consistent 
concern with the linkage between participation and the evolution/development of the child 
as a current and/or future citizen. Similarly, commentators on child participation 
demonstrate a preoccupation with the relationship between child participation and the 
enhancement of democracy (in terms of the functioning and/or outputs of the democratic 
system) including the strengthening of the child's sense of, and interest in, participation in 
democracy and their own democratic citizenship.14 
The lack of protection afforded to children's democratic participation rights in law and in 
practice is deeply problematic in light of the centrality of political participation to both the 
exercise of power in democracies and to traditional notions of citizenship. The denial of 
children's participation in democratic decision-making processes not only poses a serious 
obstacle to the conceptualisation of children as full “citizens” but undermines the legitimacy 
of the outputs of so-called representative democratic decision-making bodies in relation to 
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children's rights issues. 
This article centres on the position of children as “democratic citizens”. Incorporating 
discussions of key aspects of democratic and citizenship theory, it considers the ways in 
which children may interact with, and contribute to, the exercise of political power in 
democratic societies. Having briefly discussed the position of children vis-à-vis democratic 
processes, the author focuses on that provision of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) which is arguably of greatest use in terms of serving as a springboard for children to 
input into *P.L. 769  democratic decision-making processes that affect them: art.12 CRC. 
The author proceeds to consider the approach of the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
to children's participation rights under the CRC, arguing that the Committee has failed to 
construe and apply art.12 in such a way as to address effectively children's exclusion from 
democracy. The article concludes by highlighting key points that should be borne in mind 
when arguing in favour of particular mechanisms and structures aimed at increasing child 
participation in democratic decision-making and hence strengthening their democratic 
citizenship. 
 The position of children in democracy and why political participation 
matters from a citizenship perspective  
Children are unenfranchised. It is frequently said that they do not, and cannot, constitute 
a political constituency able to gain ground through political action.15 The executive and 
the legislature are not electorally accountable to them and are, therefore, not immediately 
dependent on their goodwill in order to ensure re-election. As non-voters, children have no 
opportunity to exert direct influence on the policy-making process. As a result, their 
interests are unlikely to occupy a consistently large space on the agenda of elected law and 
policy-makers.16 Where children and their issues do occupy “political space”, this is largely 
due to the emotive effect of child-related discourse. Such discourse is generally 
paternalistic rather than rights-based and is primarily motivated and directed by parental 
or societal perceptions of children, their activities and their interests. Thus, where 
child-related issues are on politicians' agendas, children's exclusion from democratic 
decision-making processes means that their views and input generally will not be. 
But why the focus on democratic participation? One might argue that the lack of direct 
accountability to children of the elected branches could be compensated for through the 
exertion by children of indirect influence on democratic decision-making processes. This 
might occur, for instance, through child lobbying activities or the ability of children to rely 
on voting “proxies” to forward their interests. That is, through a form of “virtual 
representation”.17 There is no doubt, however, that the limited organisational capacities, 
the lack of control over or input into the media, as well as the developmental and economic 
deficit of many children, severely reduce the ability of children as a group to exert indirect 
influence on political decision-making.18 Furthermore, it has been argued elsewhere that 
children are unable to rely fully on others (whether elected representatives, parents, or 
adults in general) to ensure that their rights-related interests are forwarded *P.L. 
770  adequately in the democratic process. In brief, this is due to (1) the lack of a 
comprehensive identity of interests between children and potential representatives, and 
(2) the inability of children to rely on “proxies” where those proxies will not benefit from 
children's rights being afforded protection.19 As a result, the principle of political 
accountability does not appear to operate effectively in relation to children, and their rights 
and interests are unlikely to be prioritised within democratic decision-making processes. 
Recent years have seen a growing awareness and discussion of “the child as citizen”, both 
among children's rights advocates and academics.20 In doing so, attention has been 
focused on the extent to which children “fit in with” traditional conceptions of citizenship 
and citizenship theory.21 
Citizenship is a contested, multifaceted notion, with conceptions and perceptions of 
citizenship differing amongst both academic commentators22 and children themselves.23 
For the sake of simplicity, I will take T.H. Marshall's celebrated, if much criticised,24 
analysis of citizenship as my starting point. Marshall regarded citizenship as being 
composed of three elements: civil, political and social.25 This article will primarily focus on 
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children's enjoyment (or not) of what Marshall labels the “political” element of 
citizenship.26 That is, the “right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a 
member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such 
a body”.27 Marshall is concerned with “political” citizenship related to the ability to hold 
political office or to vote--both of which are denied to some or all children in all liberal 
democracies. Indeed, according to Marshall, children “by definition” cannot be citizens. 
They are “citizens in the making”, rather than “full members of the community”.28 
This piece focuses on children's relationship to democratic politics. A consideration of the 
child's relationship to democratic political processes entails a broader, different construal of 
“the right to participate in the exercise of political power” than that employed by Marshall. 
In light of this, I prefer to use the terminology of the “democratic” element of children's 
citizenship (instead of the “political element”) which I take to encompass a more nuanced 
sense of how children may interact with, and contribute to, the exercise of political power 
in a society. I am, however, primarily concerned with children's relationship with, and 
*P.L. 771  impact on, democratic government, including law and policy-making. This 
contrasts with those commentators who equate “democracy” with non-political institutions 
and systems such as civil society.29 
Naturally, participation does not simply arise in the context of democratic decision-making 
and it is clear that participation need not be “political” in nature. Indeed, the political arena 
of participation may not even be that which is of greatest or most immediate importance to 
children in terms of the realisation of their rights on a day-to-day basis in light of the way 
that children's rights are frequently either provided by, or mediated through, their family 
unit. This is particularly evident in areas such as housing, social security and freedom of 
thought, conscience or religion. Where the right to education is at issue, the key forum for 
child participation may be the school or the educational context more broadly. However, 
bearing in mind that the arguments being made in this article relate to the position of 
children with regard to democratic law and policy-making processes, it is logical that the 
democratic citizenship-related “aims of participation” should be our central focus here. 
That is not to suggest that the public political and the private spheres are not strongly 
interrelated (or that the dividing lines between those spheres are clear-cut or logical). For 
instance, public laws and policies ultimately define the parameters of parental provision or 
mediation of rights, and injustice within the private sphere in terms of participation or 
distribution of rights-related goods may only be remediable through direct intervention by 
the public sphere through political action. 
I acknowledge that by primarily focusing on a variant of the “political” element of 
citizenship, this work only pays limited attention to other elements of Marshall's typology 
that may relate to the effective implementation of children's rights, either through 
democratic decision-making structures or otherwise. For instance, the social element of 
children's citizenship is clearly linked to children's enjoyment of their socio-economic 
rights, in light of Marshall's construal of social rights as constitutive of that element of 
citizenship. Indeed, one could go so far as to say that the failure to give effect to the social 
element of children's citizenship renders the political or democratic element redundant or 
impossible, given the constraints that a failure to implement children's socio-economic 
rights will impose on their ability to exercise political and civil rights. However, while 
children may be accorded those socio-economic rights that would seem to accord with 
notions of “social citizenship”, one of the underlying concerns of this article is the failure of 
those exercising political power to give effect to children's rights (including socio-economic 
rights), thereby severely curtailing children's enjoyment of this element of citizenship. One 
of the key causes for this failure is the non-accordance to children of the right to participate 
in the exercise of political power. 
Similarly, the civil element of citizenship has a key role to play in children's enjoyment of 
their rights. Many of the rights that Marshall associates with civil citizenship--and which 
have a clear relationship with children's enjoyment of “democratic” citizenship--are 
accorded to children. This is the case under both the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) and many national constitutions. Such rights include the rights to freedom of 
expression, association or thought and *P.L. 772  conscience. While the CRC and some 
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constitutions accord those rights to children specifically,30 under other constitutions, 
children enjoy such rights owing to their inclusion within the right holder category of 
“everyone”. However, even where children are accorded the civil and political rights 
accorded to “everyone”, they may not enjoy the full exercise of such rights in practice due 
to biological, socially and legally constructed obstacles. 
For instance, as stated above, the CRC accords children a number of rights traditionally 
associated with the exercise of the role of democratic citizen, such as the right to freedom 
of association and peaceful assembly and the right to freedom of expression. However, the 
role accorded to parents and others responsible for the child in art.5 CRC to provide “in a 
manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and 
guidance in the exercise by the child” of Convention rights suggests that, in practice, 
children's enjoyment of these admittedly broadly phrased rights may not be as expansive 
as that of adults who are accorded similarly expressed rights under non-child-specific 
international human rights law provisions. This is due to the fact that the civil and political 
rights accorded to adults under international human rights law are not linked to adults' 
“evolving capacities”. Furthermore, the best interests principle in art.3 CRC could also, in 
theory at least, be used to “trump” children's attempts to operationalise their civil and 
political rights where such activity is perceived (by adults) to be contrary to their “best 
interests”. 
The relative conditionality of the civil rights set out in the CRC has contributed to the 
concerns of some commentators about the extent to which the UNCRC can serve as a 
vehicle for a (broadly construed) conception of children's citizenship.31 Ultimately, 
however, children's denial of “political” rights is more profound than the denial of civil 
rights. Furthermore, their non-enjoyment of political rights is more directly linked to their 
exclusion from the political processes and institutions that are primarily responsible for 
implementing rights. Hence it makes sense to focus on the political element of citizenship 
to a greater extent. In addition, it is children's political rights that are arguably most closely 
associated with active--as opposed to passive--citizenship.32 
My concern is very much with the liberal notion of “citizenship” as a rights based or focused 
status, rather than with broader conceptions of citizenship such as, for instance, those 
linked to identity or membership of a community.33 The fact that I am working with what 
some might regard as a rather “denuded” legal version of citizenship is not to suggest that 
citizenship as “identity” or “membership of a *P.L. 773  community” is not hugely 
important to children--and to particular groups of children especially. Indeed, the 
inclusive/exclusive dichotomy resulting from the failure of “universalist” conceptions of 
citizenship to accommodate what Lister calls a “„differenced-centred‟ theorisation of 
citizenship” will have clear implications both in terms of where the line of exclusion falls 
between adults and children and between some children and other children.34 
Commentators such as Cockburn have warned against the reduction of citizenship to legal 
rights held against the state and others: in his view, a more public-spirited and radical 
conception needs to be adopted that acknowledges participation and civic activity.35 I do 
not claim that child participation linked to citizenship should take place solely in the formal, 
public political sphere (that is, through voting and representation) rather than 
encompassing the wide range of other social relations in which children are embedded, 
including those traditionally considered to be in the “private” realm.36 However, this article 
is focused, in particular, on child exclusion from the political sphere. Therefore, the 
conceptualisation of citizenship as rights operating against the state in the public sphere is 
one which seems particularly appropriate. This work centres on a liberal model of 
citizenship on the basis that the core of republican models of citizenship--political agency 
and active participation in self-rule--is denied to children. 
Although much discussion around citizenship in recent years has focused on the 
responsibilities associated with citizenship, again this will not be a major focus in this piece. 
This is due to the fact that the alleged responsibilities corresponding to rights based 
citizenship have only a limited role to play with regard to the enforcement of children's 
rights by either the elected branches of government or the courts. That is not to ignore the 
fact that, in many societies, there is increasing attention being paid to the notion of 
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children's “duties” or “responsibilities”. A preoccupation with the relationship of citizenship, 
rights and responsibilities was demonstrated in the UK Government's 2009 Green Paper on 
Rights and Responsibilities which relied on Marshall's work in outlining the argument that 
the rights associated with UK citizenship cannot be divorced from the notion of 
“responsibilities”.37 When it came to discussing the possibility of including children's rights 
in such a Bill, the UK Government referred to the responsibilities of parents, Government 
and wider society with regard to ensuring the proposed right of the child “to achieve 
wellbeing”.38 The Paper also highlighted the need for young people to be aware of “their 
own responsibilities” in UK society.39 In doing so, however, the Green Paper emphasised 
that the proposed right would not depend on children fulfilling such responsibilities.40 
Children's duties form part of a number of different constitutions--both binding or 
otherwise.41 Thus far, however, the *P.L. 774  increasing emphasis on child 
responsibilities has not yet resulted in government (or the courts) justifying a failure to 
give effect to children's rights in terms of children failing to meet their citizenship related 
responsibilities, either in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. This is perhaps unsurprising 
bearing in mind the frequent perception of children as having more reduced capacities than 
adults and hence being less “responsible”. What is perhaps more notable is the failure of 
governments to recognise rights claims of children amounting from their performance of 
“adult” responsibilities (e.g. carer's allowance for child carers). 
 Children's participation rights or the “gap” in the CRC  
Participation rights are one of the key potential vehicles for children with regard to the 
exercise of political power. As Lister highlights, such rights are of particular significance for 
children and young people because they cannot express their voice through the ballot 
box.42 Recent years have seen much discussion of the participation rights of the child, 
most notably in the context of the CRC. Article 12 of the CRC arguably has the most 
potential as a springboard for children to input into democratic decision-making processes 
that affect them of all the provisions in that instrument.43 I say “potential” because, as we 
will see below, while the Committee has focused on the notion of children as active 
participants in society, it has not addressed to any great extent the concept of children as 
democratic citizens (in the sense of having the right to have a direct formal input into 
democratic decision-making processes).44 
Considerable controversy surrounds the question of what constitutes participation, with 
commentators such as Hart, Lansdown, Treseder, Shier, and Arnstein proffering different 
typologies and models of child participation.45 “Participation activities” differ in terms of 
their aims, structures and who is involved.46 A key issue is the extent to which child 
participation entails adults being directed by, or acting upon, children's input and the 
degree to which (if at all) it involves power being transferred from adults to children. 
Many of the same questions arise in relation to child participation as do with regard to adult 
participation. Is it the process of participation that is important or is it the product of 
participation that is crucial? Different understandings of the value and aims of participation 
have implications for children's participation in a range of different contexts--whether 
political or otherwise. While children are not generally directly involved in political 
participation, it is important to bear in mind that, while participation in other contexts does 
enhance children's sense of *P.L. 775  inclusion and dignity, unless that participation 
results in (or aims to result in) children's views of the good influencing particular 
decision-making in those contexts, it is arguably of limited value. We will return to the key 
issue of the product or outcomes of child participation in the political context below. 
In its most extensive statement on the child's right to participation prior to its General 
Comment No.12 on the right of the child to be heard,47 the Committee urged states to 
guarantee systematic inclusion of the child's right to participation in policy matters, as well 
as ensuring that child participation is taken into account in resource allocation.48 The 
Committee has further stated that, where the best interests of large numbers of children 
are at stake, heads of institutions, authorities, or governmental bodies should also provide 
opportunities to hear the concerned children from such undefined groups and to give their 
views due weight when they plan actions, including legislative decisions, which directly or 
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indirectly affect children.49 The Committee is thus clearly concerned with ensuring child 
participation in a broad range of legislative, executive and administrative processes and 
contexts. 
Elsewhere, the Committee has spoken about the need for “consultation” with children to be 
meaningful and for their views to be given due weight: “appearing to „listen‟ to children is 
relatively unchallenging; giving due weight to their views requires real change”.50 
According to the Committee, the involvement of, and consultation with, children must also 
avoid being tokenistic and aim to ascertain representative views.51 Consultation or merely 
listening to children, however, is very different in nature from true participation. While 
consultation entails the eliciting of information from children which is subsequently applied 
by adult policy-makers, the latter entails the involvement of children in the 
decision-making of policy-makers. It is clear, however, that the Committee is prepared to 
describe consultative processes as “participation”. For instance, the Committee has 
described the term “participation” as “used to describe ongoing processes, which include 
information-sharing and dialogue between children and adults based on mutual respect, 
and in which children can learn how their views and those of adults are taken into account 
and shape the outcome of such processes”.52 Laura Lundy has argued that the successful 
implementation of art.12 requires consideration of the implications of four separate 
factors: space, voice, audience and influence.53 In its limited work on child democratic 
participation, the Committee has been happy to address the issues of space (children must 
be given the opportunity to express a view), voice (children must be facilitated to express 
their views) and audience (the *P.L. 776  view must be listened to).54 It has engaged to 
a far lesser degree with the issue of influence. That is, the requirement that the child's view 
must be acted upon, as appropriate.55 
The Committee's understanding of consultation as constituting participation is probably 
unsurprising given the emphasis in art.12 on the child's “right to be heard” and the fact that 
children's views are not determinative under that provision. However, an approach to child 
participation that is limited to consultation is unlikely to result in children becoming 
involved in traditionally adult spheres that are crucial to the realisation of their rights. Nor 
is it likely to achieve the potential of activating children as political actors: to change 
political and policy-making processes and outcomes.56 
The Committee has decried the fact that the child's rights to express her view on issues 
that affect her and to have those views duly “considered” continues to be impeded by, 
among other things, political barriers.57 It has frequently exhorted states to conduct a 
regular review of the extent to which children participate in the development and 
evaluation of laws and policies affecting them and to evaluate the extent to which children's 
views are taken into consideration, including their impact on relevant policies and 
programmes.58 However, the Committee has failed to adopt a detailed, convincing stance 
on the issue of child participation in law and policy-making processes that affect them by 
outlining in detail how the views of children should be given “due weight” in practice.59 For 
instance, by suggesting what weight should be accorded to children's views in particular, 
concrete contexts or when balanced against the views of other, more powerful actors. In 
fairness to the Committee, its failure to do so may be at least partially attributable to the 
fact that the lack of a complaints mechanism associated with the CRC means that the 
Committee is ordinarily called on to deal with general questions of implementation of CRC 
rights. In contrast, a complaints mechanism would enable the Committee to apply and 
develop CRC standards in the context of concrete fact scenarios. The constraints of the 
reporting procedures, including the limited time available to focus on particular reports and 
for discussion with delegates and other stakeholders, also pose practical or operational 
obstacles to the Committee's work in this and other areas. That said, the Committee's 
failure to engage with such questions in the context of its concluding observations (which 
enable the Committee to address specific domestic situations and issues to some extent at 
least) is a shortcoming that should be remedied. 
More generally, in urging states parties to establish clear guidelines on how the views 
presented by children in such forums are taken into account by the formal political process 
and in policy-making,60 the Committee has failed to outline a more direct participatory role 
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for, or system of representation of, children in such processes which would result in their 
views being potentially determinative in *P.L. 777  relation to decision-making affecting 
their rights.61 For instance, by recommending the amendment of the franchise to 
introduce a weighted voting system, under which children are accorded a share of an adult 
vote which increases over time proportionate to the child's age. Nor, despite being 
prepared to adopt quite an assertive stance with regard to age limits in the contexts of 
labour,62 legal majority63 and criminal responsibility,64 has the Committee addressed the 
implications of art.12 for voting ages other than to commend states for enacting lower 
voting ages.65 This is notwithstanding the Committee's acknowledgement that “given that 
few States as yet have reduced the voting age below 18, there is all the more reason to 
ensure respect for the views of unenfranchised children in Government and Parliament”.66 
The Human Rights Committee stated in its General Comment No.25 on the right to 
participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access to public service that 
the right to vote at elections must be established by law and subject “only to reasonable 
restrictions, such as setting a minimum age limit for the right to vote”.67 It did not, 
however, prescribe what an “unreasonable” age limit might be. 
Freeman contests whether it is appropriate for a Convention which is to be targeted 
worldwide to specify a voting age when voting means so little in most of the world.68 This 
is a legitimate point; however, the Committee's failure to actively encourage states parties 
to lower voting ages means that it is failing to provide support to those children (and their 
advocates) who are campaigning for a reduction in the age of enfranchisement. A 
statement from the Committee would constitute an important advocacy tool for such 
groups. The Committee's relative silence on this issue is also problematic in light of the fact 
that state action on voting ages is not necessarily always focused on the question of 
lowering such ages. In 2007, the Guardian Council in Iran approved a Bill passed by the 
Iranian Parliament increasing the voting age in national elections from 15 to 18.69 The 
legislation was apparently motivated by government concerns that younger voters voted in 
high numbers for Reformist opposition parties in the December 2006 elections.70 This 
move constituted an explicit disempowerment of children between the ages of 15 *P.L. 
778  and 18 in terms of denying them direct political participation. While there have been 
moves towards returning the age of enfranchisement to 15, this has not yet occurred.71 
In General Comment No.12 and elsewhere,72 the Committee refers positively to “the 
growing number of local youth parliaments, municipal children's councils and ad hoc 
consultations where children can voice their views in decision-making processes”, 
describing these as “structures for formal representative participation in local 
government”.73 At the same time, it has criticised governmental failure to have regard to 
the outputs of such bodies and has acknowledged that, while one-off or regular events like 
child parliaments can be stimulating and raise general awareness, art.12 requires 
consistent and ongoing arrangements.74 Indeed, a child participant in the working group 
on “A new democratic dynamic: child participation in the public sphere” at the October 
2009 Celebration of the 20th Anniversary Celebration of the CRC in Geneva made the 
crucial point that events such as “child parliamentary days” may involve children talking to 
each other rather than to adults. Thus, in practice, the opportunity for inter-generational 
dialogue may be severely circumscribed. Unfortunately, observations such as this were not 
integrated into the recommendations of the working group, which ultimately merely 
echoed points previously made by the Committee in relation to child participation.75 
The Committee has expressed concern about bodies such as youth parliaments or councils 
being unrepresentative in terms of gender or geographical region and only allowing for the 
engagement of a relatively small number of children.76 For instance, some children's 
municipal councils or committees are elected only by members of “children's clubs” rather 
than by the entire child and youth population of the municipality or area/constituency that 
such a body is meant to represent.77 In others, voting for council members is restricted to 
children at school or of a certain age.78 The Committee has not, however, engaged with 
the issue that the “representativeness” of such bodies is generally dependent on adult 
definitions of *P.L. 779  representativeness, rather than resulting from those of children 
(or all of the children that such bodies are intended to represent). This is undoubtedly at 
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least partially attributable to the fact that the Committee is made up exclusively of adults. 
It is highly questionable whether providing a child with an opportunity to express their 
views with regard to political decision-making that does not result in those views effectively 
influencing decision-making does, in fact, constitute “formal representative 
participation”--whatever the Committee might suggest to the contrary. Indeed, while it 
may constitute “formal” participation (in the sense of “going through the motions”), it 
seems highly unlikely to qualify as substantive or “effective” (in the sense of children's 
views being brought to bear). The Committee seems to have gone further in the context of 
the rights of children with disabilities, stating that: 
“… [C]hildren should be represented in various bodies such as parliament, committees and 
other forums where they may voice views and participate in the making of decisions that 
affect them as children in general and as children with disabilities specifically.”79 
Importantly, this especial focus on children with disabilities, together with the Committee's 
concern that child participation be “representative”, reflects an awareness that especial 
care must be taken that the voices of the most vulnerable and marginalised children should 
be heard. 
It is, of course, important not to become overly focused on formal direct forms of 
participation in political processes. That said, bearing in mind the reality that such forms of 
participation seem more likely to have a concrete impact on political decision-making with 
regard to children's rights than indirect ones, the Committee's failure to address them in 
adequate depth is problematic. One might also argue that a focus on the part of the 
Committee on children's participation in formal political decision-making processes would 
be inappropriate as such a conception of participation reflects an understanding of 
participation in terms of a child's capacity for individualistic autonomous decision-making. 
It is arguable that child participation would be more appropriately understood as simply an 
expression of agency by the child.80 
Admittedly, the Committee has recognised the agency of younger children, stating that 
such children “make choices and communicate their feelings, ideas and wishes in 
numerous ways, long before they are able to communicate through the conventions of 
spoken or written language”.81 In its General Comment specifically devoted to art.12, the 
Committee highlighted that the full implementation of that provision: 
 *P.L. 780  “… requires recognition of, and respect for, non-verbal forms of 
communication including play, body language, facial expressions, and drawing and 
painting, through which very young children demonstrate understanding, choices and 
preferences.”82 
However, the Committee's recognition of younger children's agency is arguably tempered 
by its direction that art.12 should be implemented from the earliest stages “in ways 
appropriate to the child's capacities, best interests, and rights to protection from harmful 
experiences”.83 Thus, giving effect to the participation rights in art.12 is to be constrained 
by, or subjugated to, the more welfare or protection-focused elements of the CRC. More 
positively, the Committee has emphasised that the right of participation requires adults “to 
show patience and creativity by adapting their expectations to a young child's interests, 
levels of understanding and preferred ways of communicating”.84 Overall, however, the 
Committee has paid only limited attention to more complex notions of participation as an 
expression of agency. 
 The way forward?  
The Committee's failure to employ art.12 effectively to address children's exclusion from 
democracy is perhaps unsurprising in light of Shier's observation that, until recently, there 
has been little sign of mutual learning or cross-fertilisation between the fields of child and 
youth participation and participatory governance.85 This is despite the fact that supporters 
of the CRC have praised the Convention for constructing children as “active citizens” and 
for calling: 
“… upon states to ensure that they are active, participating citizens, playing a role in 
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governance „according to their age and maturity‟, rather than simply being passively 
governed.”86 
It is important to note that I am not arguing that children's non-participation and 
non-representation in terms of democratic processes would be automatically remedied by 
extending the vote to children.87 However, bearing in mind the centrality of the “right to 
vote” to the counter-majoritarian objection to judicial review, it is important to highlight 
that voting and democratic decision-making as they currently operate do not provide 
children with an engine to advance their rights and interests directly or effectively through 
the political system. Merely extending the vote to children will not, in and of itself, bring 
about the societal, cultural and structural reform that is necessary to address the 
disadvantage and relative powerlessness experienced by children as a group in society.88 
(Furthermore, *P.L. 781  bearing in mind that there is evidence that some groups of 
children do not wish to vote (or do not wish other children to vote),89 extending the 
franchise to children might risk undermining children's participation-related preferences.) 
Ultimately, even if there was universal suffrage of children, there would still be some who 
would not be able to vote (for instance, the very young). This is not to suggest that most 
children lack the competence to vote or should not be granted the right to vote--rather, it 
is simply a recognition that there will inevitably be some children for whom “voting” will not 
serve as a mechanism by which to ensure participation in the decisions affecting them.90 
Nor am I suggesting that democratic decision-making processes as they stand will afford 
optimal participation even to those children who are able to exercise the vote. A number of 
commentators have argued convincingly that changes may need to be made to democratic 
decision-making processes--and, indeed, mechanisms and fora for involvement more 
generally--as they are currently constituted in order to render “democracy” more 
inclusive.91 Thomas highlights that, if the challenge of children's participation is to open up 
existing institutions to “the voices of children”, then it is necessary to ask how far those 
existing institutions have to change in order for this to happen.92 In making such changes 
from a child-centric perspective, account must be taken of Hinton's observation that 
children's ability to engage with government as active citizens is often prevented not only 
by structural obstacles but also by the subconscious biases that result from dominant 
understandings of childhood.93 Changes to democratic processes may not serve to ensure 
effective participation for excluded groups in the absence of a broader cultural shift in 
attitude towards members of those groups and the value to be accorded to their views. This 
is certainly true in the case of children whose exclusion from direct participation in the 
democratic system is so profound. There also needs to be a careful interrogation of 
systems of participation for children in democracy to ensure that participation is 
effective--in terms of ensuring that it results in children's views and interests are given 
effect in political decision-making--rather being simply formal or tokenistic in nature. 
Shier has noted that, as a general rule, the younger the children involved, the less well 
served they will be by processes that mimic those used by adults and the more crucial it 
therefore becomes to devise, test and validate new processes appropriate to the evolving 
capacities of young children.94 This should be borne in mind when arguing in favour of the 
particular mechanisms and structures aimed at increasing child participation in democratic 
decision-making. It certainly calls for the Committee and others working in the context of 
child participation to employ considerably greater imagination when considering models by 
which *P.L. 782  children might participate in and input into democratic processes. If, as 
Young says, the normative legitimacy of a democratic decision depends on the degree to 
which those affected by it have been included in the decision-making processes and have 
had the opportunity to influence the outcomes,95 then the legitimacy of democratic 
decision-making on children's rights is seriously open to question. 
 Conclusion  
In sum, participation as described by the CRC (at least insofar as it has been construed by 
Committee) seems unlikely to play a key role in guaranteeing democratic citizenship to 
children.96 As Freeman highlights, denial of citizenship rights to children means they are 
not regarded as active agents and their interests can easily be ignored.97 Given the impact 
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that children's exclusion from democracy has for both the potential and actual realisation of 
their rights, the Committee's failure to engage with this issue adequately poses a serious 
threat to the implementation of children's civil, political, socio-economic and cultural 
rights. 
It is crucial that the Committee should proceed to proactively and self-consciously develop 
its work in this area. September 2009 saw UNICEF sending out a call for examples of 
children interacting directly with parliamentarians where interaction has had an impact on 
budgets, law-making, or the direction of policy and planning.98 Apparently, UNICEF's 
research in this area will ultimately inform a guidebook on child and adolescent 
participation within parliamentary processes that will be presented to parliamentarians and 
other stakeholders across the globe in efforts to enhance participation within these 
processes. While this is not a Committee initiative, it is to be hoped that the research will 
serve as a useful evidence base for the Committee in developing its work in this context. 
The failure of the Committee on the Rights of the Child to lead the way in relation to 
children's democratic participation and citizenship means that there is neither strong 
motivation nor guidance for states to guarantee such in their own laws. This gap in the 
Committee's jurisprudence necessarily filters down into the practice of states. Ultimately, 
in its future consideration of art.12, the Committee must advance beyond simply 
acknowledging and condemning children's limited role in democratic decision-making, to 
outlining what concrete measures must be taken by states both in law and in practice so as 
to ensure that children's democratic citizenship is secured. 
 Dr Aoife Nolan (LLB, PhD), aoifeanolan@gmail.com. The author is very grateful to Prof. 
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